In logic, an argumentum ad populum (Latin for "appeal to the people") is a fallacious argument that concludes a proposition to be true because many or most people believe it; which alleges: "If many believe so, it is so."
This type of argument is known by several names,[1] including appeal to the masses, appeal to belief, appeal to the majority, argument by consensus, consensus fallacy, authority of the many, and bandwagon fallacy, and in Latin as argumentum ad numerum ("appeal to the number"), and consensus gentium ("agreement of the clans"). It is also the basis of a number of social phenomena, including communal reinforcement and the bandwagon effect. The Chinese proverb "three men make a tiger" concerns the same idea.
Contents |
This fallacy is sometimes committed while trying to convince a person that a widely popular thought is true.
It is sometimes committed when trying to convince a person that unpopular theories are false.
The fallacy is also common in marketing:
Other examples:
The argumentum ad populum is a red herring and genetic fallacy. It appeals on probabilistic terms; given that 75% of a population answer A to a question where the answer is unknown, the argument states that it is reasonable to assume that the answer is indeed A. In cases where the answer can be known but is not known by a questioned entity, the appeal to majority provides a possible answer with a relatively high probability of correctness.
There is the problem of determining just how many are needed to have a majority or consensus. Is merely greater than 50% significant enough and why? Should the percentage be larger, such as 80 or 90 percent, and how does that make a real difference? Is there real consensus if there are one or even two people who have a different claim that is proven to be true?
It is logically fallacious because the mere fact that a belief is widely-held is not necessarily a guarantee that the belief is correct; if the belief of any individual can be wrong, then the belief held by multiple persons can also be wrong. The argument that because 75% of people polled think the answer is A implies that the answer is A, this argument fails, because if opinion did determine truth, then there be no way to deal with the discrepancy between the 75% of the sample population that believe the answer is A and 25% who are of the opinion that the answer is not A. However small the percentage of those polled is distributed among any remaining answers, this discrepancy by definition disproves any guarantee of the correctness of the majority. In addition, this would be true even if the answer given by those polled were unanimous, as the sample size may be insufficient, or some fact may be unknown to those polled that, if known, would result in a different distribution of answers.
This fallacy is similar in structure to certain other fallacies that involve a confusion between the justification of a belief and its widespread acceptance by a given group of people. When an argument uses the appeal to the beliefs of a group of supposed experts, it takes on the form of an appeal to authority; if the appeal is to the beliefs of a group of respected elders or the members of one's community over a long period of time, then it takes on the form of an appeal to tradition.
One who commits this fallacy may assume that individuals commonly analyze and edit their beliefs and behaviors. This is often not the case (see conformity).
The argumentum ad populum can be a valid argument in inductive logic; for example, a poll of a sizeable population may find that 90% prefer a certain brand of product over another. A cogent (strong) argument can then be made that the next person to be considered will also prefer that brand, and the poll is valid evidence of that claim. However, it is unsuitable as an argument for deductive reasoning as proof, for instance to say that the poll proves that the preferred brand is superior to the competition in its composition or that everyone prefers that brand to the other.
Appeal to belief is valid only when the question is whether the belief exists. Appeal to popularity is therefore valid only when the questions are whether the belief is widespread and to what degree. I.e., ad populum only proves that a belief is popular, not that it is true. In some domains, however, it is popularity rather than other strengths that makes a choice the preferred one.
The "correctness" of electoral processes lies in the prior acceptance by the electorate that the outcome of an election shall be enacted no matter what it is.
Democracy is based on appeal to popularity. As a means of determining the truth of beliefs, it is fallacious (see consensus reality and wikiality). Democracy does not obviate this; it merely makes the fallacy irrelevant as correctness is defined by popularity in its case (possibly subject to constitutional restrictions).
Argumentum ad populum explains how some democracies (e.g. Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy) have fallen victim to the tyranny of the majority.
The following argument is an Appeal to consequences:
Similarly fallacious is the following argument:
In the statement 3, free will means the ability of a human being to act based on his/her right or wrong wills.
Matters of social convention, such as etiquette or polite manners, depend upon the wide acceptance of the convention. As such, argumentum ad populum is not fallacious when referring to the popular belief about what is polite or proper:
Social conventions can change, however, and sometimes very quickly. Thus, the fact that everyone in Russia this year thinks that it is polite to kiss can not be used as evidence that everyone always believed that, or that they should always believe it.
The philosophical question of moral relativism asks whether such arguments apply to statements of morals.
Whether to follow a tenet decided by popularity rather than logical design may be a matter of safety or convenience:
In this case, the choice of which side to drive on is basically arbitrary. However, to avoid head-on collisions, everyone on the road must agree on it. In many cases, what is safe to do depends on what others expect one will do, and thus on the "popularity" of that choice.
Linguistic descriptivists argue that correct grammar, spelling, and expressions are defined by the language's speakers, especially in languages which do not have a central governing body. According to this viewpoint, if an incorrect expression is commonly used, it becomes correct. In contrast, linguistic prescriptivists believe that incorrect expressions are incorrect regardless of how many people use them.
In some circumstances, a person may argue that the fact that the majority of a people believes X implies that X is false. This line of thought is closely related to the ad hominem, appeal to emotion, poisoning the well, and guilt by association fallacies given that it invokes a person's contempt for the general populace or something about the general populace in order to persuade them that the majority is wrong about X. The ad populum reversal commits exactly the same logical flaw as the original fallacy given that the idea "X is true" is inherently separate from the idea that "Most people believe X".
For example, consider the arguments:
In general, the reversal usually goes: Most people believe A and B are both true. B is false. Thus, A is false. The similar fallacy of chronological snobbery is not to be confused with the ad populum reversal. Chronological snobbery is the claim that if belief in both X and Y was popularly held in the past and if Y was recently proved to be untrue then X must also be untrue. That line of argument is based on a belief in historical progress and not—like the ad populum reversal is—on whether or not X and/or Y is currently popular.
|
|||||